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Abstract—In the context of multi-tenant SaaS applications,
data conﬁdentiality support is increasingly being offered from
within the application layer instead of the database layer or the
storage layer to accommodate continuously changing require-
ments of multiple tenants. Application-level data management
middleware platforms are becoming increasingly compelling for
dealing with the complexity of a multi-cloud or a federated cloud
storage architecture as well as multi-tenant SaaS applications.
However, these platforms typically support traditional data
mapping strategies that are created under the assumption of
a ﬁxed and rigorous database schema. Thus, mapping data
objects while supporting varying data conﬁdentiality require-
ments, therefore, leads to fragmentation of data over distributed
storage nodes. This introduces signiﬁcant performance overhead
at the level of individual database transactions (e.g., CRUD
transactions) and negatively affects the overall scalability.
To address these challenges, we present a dedicated data
mapping strategy that leverages the data schema ﬂexibility of
columnar NoSQL databases to accomplish dynamic and ﬁne-
grained data encryption in a more efﬁcient and scalable manner.
We validate these solutions in the context of an industrial
multi-tenant SaaS application and conduct a comprehensive
performance evaluation. The results conﬁrm that the proposed
data mapping strategy indeed yields scalability and performance
improvements.
Keywords-Cloud data storage, NoSQL, Data encryption, Un-
trusted clouds, Secure data management, Multi-tenant SaaS
I. INTRODUCTION
The limitations of traditional relational databases in a cloud
environment has lead to the development of a set of cloud-
friendly databases commonly known as NoSQL databases [7],
[26]. NoSQL databases have become the backbone of cloud-
based applications as they ease handling of large volumes of
data, while also ensuring optimal performance, high availabil-
ity, and elastic scalability [4], [19].
Cloud data storage –as a key enabler of cloud computing–
offers numerous beneﬁts in terms of inﬁnite capacity on
demand, no upfront cost, elastic scalability, etc [9]. For these
reasons, many organizations actively outsource their storage
to external third-party cloud storage providers [27]. However,
organizations are also often reluctant to store their sensitive
data to external third-party cloud providers, due to limited trust
and privacy issues [9], [12], [17]. This forms a main obstacle to
wider adoption of cloud storage and the respective cloud stor-
age providers [18], [25]. In addition, relying only on database-
level access control does not sufﬁce [15] as it still relies on
trust in the storage provider who can bypass such mechanisms.
Therefore, cryptographically encrypting conﬁdential data from
within the application layer is the most feasible and widely
adopted cloud storage data security tactic [20].
In the context of a multi-tenant Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) application, complex conﬁdentiality and privacy re-
quirements, which differ considerably between tenants must
be supported in an efﬁcient and scalable manner. For example,
different customer organizations (tenants) may impose differ-
ent conﬁdentiality requirements at any level of granularity (i.e.
from entity towards individual attributes). However, addressing
these requirements in the storage layer is impossible as it
does not support encryption at the most ﬁne-grained level [9].
Similarly, encryption at the database layer operates on a ﬁxed
schema, makes it extremely difﬁcult to handle continuously
changing encryption requirements of individual tenants at run-
time, which seek ﬂexibility in the schema and therefore is
undesirable. Encryption at increasing levels of granularity,
which can also be altered at run-time is feasible in the
application layer, but is not transparent to the application [9].
This requires signiﬁcant modiﬁcation in the application and
hence introduces substantial application complexity.
Moreover, the existing traditional data mapping strategies
hinder performance signiﬁcantly by the use of encryption and
thus do not allow efﬁcient database transactions. For example,
applying encryption for a particular tenant at a more ﬁne-
grained level (i.e. individual attributes) leads to with encrypted
data being organized in multiple database rows, which is
a data mapping strategy that suffers from scalability and
performance problems. Furthermore, the overall performance
of CRUD database transactions is affected when encrypted
attributes of an entity end up being stored as multiple rows in
an encrypted table. Consequently, in a distributed setup —in
which rows of a table are distributed across multiple storage
nodes based on the partition key— data logically belonging
together (e.g. encrypted attributes of the same entity) easily
become scattered on different nodes, which limits scalability
in general and further introduces a performance disadvantage
when having to reassemble the entity.
This paper presents an alternative data mapping strategy
that addresses these problems by leveraging the data schema
ﬂexibility of columnar NoSQL databases such as Apache
Cassandra [2], thereby supporting dynamic data encryption at
different levels of granularity and avoiding data fragmentation
in a distributed storage setup. We envision our data mapping
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strategy to be supported within the middleware layer in order
to (i) make it transparent and reusable solution to be used
within different applications, (ii) address different conﬁdential-
ity requirements of individual tenants at run-time by offering
data encryption support at various levels of granularity, and
(iii) provide a support to secure both data-in-motion (while
data moving between the application and the database) and
data-at-rest (data is stored in the permanent storage such as
database), while also ensuring good performance and bet-
ter scalability. Our prototype implements and integrates this
strategy in the context of an existing data access middleware
platform, Impetus Kundera [1], and functionally validates this
in the context of a realistic multi-tenant SaaS application.
By systematically benchmarking, we clearly show the perfor-
mance and scalability beneﬁts of the proposed solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces a motivating case and describes the state-
of-practice to realize the conﬁdentiality requirements of the
motivating case. Section III describes our solution, which
leverages columnar NoSQL databases to accomplish scalable,
dynamic, and ﬁne-grained data encryption. Section IV presents
our evaluation, while Section V connects and contrasts our
work with other related research. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the work and indicates future research directions.
II. MOTIVATION
This paper is motivated by requirements that we encoun-
tered in a number of industrial SaaS application cases [3],
[6]. For illustration purposes, we focus on one such appli-
cation case which we introduce in Section II-A. However,
we do intend our solution to be applicable to a wide range
of applications. Then, Section II-B outlines tenant-speciﬁc
conﬁdentiality requirements of the motivating case. Finally,
Section II-C illustrates the application of data encryption in
the current state-of-practice, and Section II-D discusses the
limitations of this approach, as such motivating this work.
A. Multi-Tenant Log Management Case
The running example in this paper is a multi-tenant Log
Management-as-a-Service (LMaaS) application. This SaaS ap-
plication provides log management facilities to its customer
organizations (i.e. tenants). The tenants of this SaaS applica-
tion are organizations from different application domains, for
instance, banks, hospitals, supermarkets, etc. The application
focuses on storing large amounts of heterogeneous data: raw
log entries, archived logs, log meta-data, historical logs,
incident reports, and time series data and is successful in
doing so by combining external cloud storage resources and
different database technologies in a so-called federated storage
architecture, and by applying multi-tenancy, i.e. sharing these
storage resources and technologies maximally among tenants.
In the case of the multi-tenant log management application,
log aggregation components are installed at the tenants’ side,
which generate streams of log events. Figure 1 illustrates three
such log events, each sent by a different tenant organization,
which are stored in a single Log table.
ID DeviceID DeviceName DeviceType … Tenant 
1 401 BRI-Router-001 ciscortr … 1 
2 701 BRI-special-001 cisco-ace … 2 
3 301 CAN-PIX-FW-001 Pix7 … 3 
rows 
Fig. 1: Log table for storing events information.
The table holds a chunk of log data, identiﬁed by an ID
attribute, which uniquely identiﬁes each row in the Log table.
The (DeviceID, DeviceName, DeviceType, and ...) attributes
hold information about the devices that generate the log events.
The Tenant attribute refers to the tenant for which the log event
is generated.
B. Tenant-speciﬁc Data Conﬁdentiality Requirements
In the context of a multi-tenant SaaS application, not
all tenants share the same conﬁdentiality requirements and
different data conﬁdentiality requirements may affect different
levels of granularity. As an example from the multi-tenant log
management application, we contrast three tenant organiza-
tions, a ﬁnancial agency (i.e. a bank), a medical institution
(i.e. a hospital), and a small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) representing a supermarket, that each imposes contrast-
ing conﬁdentiality requirements: stricter regulations on data
conﬁdentiality apply for the ﬁnancial and medical institutions,
as opposed to the SME (see Figure 2).
To illustrate this, as the tenant with id 1 is a ﬁnancial
agency, even the meta-data about the device is considered
highly sensitive. Similarly, stricter conﬁdential requirements
apply to the tenant with id 3, which represents a medical in-
stitution (DeviceID, DeviceName, and DeviceType attributes)
as compared to the tenant with id 2, which represents an SME
(DeviceID and DeviceName attributes) as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Tenants of the log management application enforce
conﬁdentiality requirements at differing levels of granularity.
A multi-tenant SaaS application such as the log management
application has to deal with heterogeneous data of varying
degrees of conﬁdentiality from different tenants. Therefore,
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such applications must have the technical ability to vary
their data storage policies accordingly and dynamically (for
example, when tenants update their service-level-agreement
(SLA) stipulations).
C. State-of-Practice Data Mapping
The current research is mainly focused on solving the
encryption problem at the database layer. Therefore, existing
solutions in both the current state-of-art [10], [28] and the
state-of-practice [11], [14] are based on a ﬁxed database
schema and provide limited support for the data encryption1.
However, addressing the contrasting and continuously chang-
ing conﬁdentiality requirements of each tenant requires ﬂexi-
bility in the data model to support considerably different levels
of encryption (e.g., encrypt full entity, speciﬁc attributes).
The state-of-practice solution to perform encryption at
different levels of granularity is to separate the sensitive
data from the non-sensitive data in different database tables.
The data is commonly separated to support encryption at
differing levels of granularity, which cannot be expressed in
the ﬁxed database schema model. This involves grouping all
sensitive attributes of a row, which need to be encrypted and
storing them together. This results in a reduced number of
encryption operations, however, it comes with a considerable
amount of computational overhead. For example, performing
the decryption operation on one out of several encrypted
attributes, computational overhead would be incurred due to
decryption of all other encrypted attributes. Therefore, to
perform encryption at differing levels of granularity without
incurring too much computational overhead, each attribute
of an entity, which needs to be encrypted must be stored
separately.
In the context of database mapping, a new table is com-
monly created to separate the sensitive data from the non-
sensitive data. As shown in Figure 3, Encrypted_Log table,
which holds ciphertext is created to store the sensitive data of
the Log table, which contains plaintext (see Figure 1).
ID Table EncName Value TID Tenant 
Log|1|1 Log  Byte[] 1 1 
Log|2|2|DeviceID Log DeviceID Byte[] 2 2 
Log|2|2|DeviceName Log DeviceName Byte[] 2 2 
Log|3|3|DeviceID Log DeviceID Byte[] 3 3 
Log|3|3|DeviceName Log DeviceName Byte[] 3 3 
Log|3|3|DeviceType Log DeviceType Byte[] 3 3 
partition key 
partitions/rows 
Fig. 3: Encrypted_Log table for storing encrypted events
information (ciphertext).
The ID attribute is a single partition key, which uniquely
identiﬁes each row within the Encrypted_Log table. The
partition key is made up by combining several attributes
(Table, ID, Tenant, and EncName) of the Log table. This
combination of attributes to create a partition key helps ﬁnding
each encrypted attribute of the Log table for a particular tenant
1We further discuss these solutions in Section V.
by a simple key lookup without a full table scan. In addition,
it neglects the need to create costly (in terms of performance)
secondary indexes on non-primary key attributes for search
reasons. The Table attribute contains the name of the table
for which the data is encrypted and thus allow us to store
conﬁdential data from multiple tables in a single encrypted
table. The (EncName and Value) attributes store the name and
the value of encrypted attributes of the Log table respectively.
The TID attribute holds the primary key of the encrypted row
of the Log table, whereas the Tenant attribute contains the
information about the tenant, for which the data is encrypted.
Let us resume the multi-tenant log management application,
in which the tenant with id 1 (represents a ﬁnancial agency) en-
forces all the device information including the meta-data about
the device to be highly sensitive, which is combined together,
encrypted, and stored in a single row of the Encrypted_Log
table (shown in white in Figure 3). The EncName attribute is
speciﬁed as an empty value, which represents that the full
entity of the Log table is encrypted. In the case of ﬁne-
grained data encryption, the tenant with id 2 has speciﬁed the
(DeviceID and DeviceName) attributes as conﬁdential, which
are stored in two different rows in the Encrypted_Log
table (shown in gray in Figure 3). The ﬁrst row contains
encrypted information about the DeviceID, whereas the second
row holds the encrypted information about the DeviceName.
Similarly, for the tenant with id 3, (DeviceID, DeviceName,
and DeviceType) attributes contain sensitive information and
therefore are stored in three different rows (shown in dark
gray in Figure 3). After completing the encryption process,
encrypted data of the Log table is stored in 6 partitions in the
Encrypted_Log table (see Figure 3) and the Log table is
organized schematically in Figure 4.
ID DeviceID DeviceName DeviceType … Tenant 
2 ********** ********** cisco-ace … 2 
3 ********** ********** ********** … 3 
rows 
Fig. 4: Log table after applying the encryption process.
D. Limitations in Current State-of-Practice
Data encryption impacts performance signiﬁcantly. How-
ever, in the state-of-practice, data separation (i.e. separating
sensitive data from the non-sensitive data) without considering
an efﬁcient data mapping strategy and the underlying data
storage model, results in an inefﬁcient implementation.
Let us consider the conﬁdentiality requirements of the tenant
with id 3, which represents a medical institution and enforces
encryption on (DeviceID, DeviceName, and DeviceType) at-
tributes. After applying the encryption process as discussed in
Section II-C, each of these encrypted attributes is stored as a
separate row in the Encrypted_Log table (shown in dark
gray in Figure 3). This creates one-to-many mapping between
the Log table (contains plaintext, see Figure 1) and the
Encrypted_Log table (contains ciphertext, see Figure 3).
The one-to-many mapping implies that the attributes, which
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need to be encrypted for a particular tenant in a single
row of the Log table are stored in multiple rows in the
Encrypted_Log table. For example, encrypting 3 attributes
of the Log table for the tenant with id 3, 3 rows are added
in the Encrypted_Log table, each representing a single
encrypted attribute (shown in dark gray in Figure 3).
This signiﬁcantly impacts the performance when reading,
updating, and deleting a single row of the Log table, which
involves several attributes to be encrypted. In that case, multi-
ple rows of the Encrypted_Log table will be needed to
consider to resemble a single row of the Log table. The
performance impact is even worse in a distributed setup, where
the data among the nodes is distributed based on the partition
key. In such a setup, attributes of a single row of the Log
table, which are encrypted and stored in multiple rows in
the Encrypted_Log table (see Figure 3), distribute across
multiple nodes in a cluster. In a distributed environment, each
row of the Encrypted_Log table belongs to a speciﬁc node
in a cluster. As illustrated in Figure 1, encrypted data of a
single row of the Log table which belongs to the tenant with
id 3 and stored in multiple rows in the Encrypted_Log
table (shown in dark gray in Figure 3) is distributed across
multiple nodes (i.e. Node a ... Node n) in a cluster (shown in
dark gray in Figure 5).
ID Table EncName Value TID Tenant 
Log|1|1 Log  Byte[] 1 1 
Log|2|2|DeviceID Log DeviceID Byte[] 2 2 
Log|2|2|DeviceName Log DeviceName Byte[] 2 2 
Log|3|3|DeviceID Log DeviceID Byte[] 3 3 
Log|3|3|DeviceName Log DeviceName Byte[] 3 3 
Log|3|3|DeviceType Log DeviceType Byte[] 3 3 
Partition key 
Partitions/rows 
… 
 
ID … … 
Log|2|2|DeviceID … … 
Log|3|3|DeviceName … … 
   
Node a  
ID … … 
Log|3|3|DeviceType … … 
Log|2|2|DeviceName … … 
   
Node n 
Data distribution across nodes 
Fig. 5: Encrypted attributes of a single row of the Log table
are partitioned across multiple nodes in a distributed setup.
Consequently, considering more attributes of a row for a
particular tenant to be encrypted, additional rows will be
inserted in the Encrypted_Log table. In a distributed setup,
this leads newly inserted rows to be either stored on (i) existing
nodes that contain the same row data, but rows will be added
in a vertical fashion (see Figure 5), or (ii) different nodes
in a cluster than the one that already contains a part of the
row data. Therefore, read, update, and delete operations come
with an additional performance degradation. For example, to
perform such operations in a distributed setup, ﬁrst multiple
nodes in a cluster need to be coordinated (i.e. inter-node
communication is required). Then, multiple rows within a node
need to be considered to perform a single read, update, and
delete operation.
III. LEVERAGING NOSQL FOR SCALABLE AND DYNAMIC
ENCRYPTION
As discussed in the previous section, encryption impacts
performance signiﬁcantly due to the computational complexity
and an inefﬁcient implementation. The inefﬁciency is mostly
related to the management and the distribution of encrypted
data. This, in turn, causes an additional performance degrada-
tion than the impact introduced by the encryption itself. The
key challenge is to perform encryption without incurring too
much performance overhead. Therefore, designing a solution
to support scalable, dynamic, and ﬁne-grained data encryption
requires, among other things, an understanding of the under-
lying database storage model.
In order to support scalable and dynamic data encryption
for multi-tenant SaaS applications, we need an alternative data
mapping strategy. As the conﬁdentiality requirements of each
tenant are variable, the ﬂexibility of the Cassandra data model
makes a clear and convenient choice to deal with the problem
of data encryption. Therefore, our proposed solution leverages
the ﬂexibility of the Cassandra data model, in terms of its abil-
ity to support dynamic columns. In the underlying data storage
model, we have also focused on separating the sensitive data
from the non-sensitive data. The separation is clearly desirable
when encryption at various levels of granularity at run-time
is required, which demands ﬂexibility in the data model and
may also differ considerably among tenants. However, we have
considered a mapping strategy that avoids data fragmentation
across nodes, while also achieving high performance lookup
and linear scalability.
We implemented and integrated this strategy in the middle-
ware layer and thus it is generic, reusable, and transparent
to the application. The middleware provides a set of annota-
tions to be used in the application to specify different data
conﬁdentiality requirements at various levels of granularity.
Any application which requires dynamic and ﬁne-grained data
encryption can be modelled on top of our middleware without
having to re-write an extensive source code in the application.
In the underlying data storage model, the middleware layer
changes the mapping strategy for the table which stores
sensitive data. As an example, in the case of multi-tenant
log management application, the middleware modeled the
Encrypted_Log table, which stores ciphertext using a com-
posite partition key and a simple clustering key. The composite
partition key and a simple clustering key are made up of
multiple attributes of an entity. For example, (Table, ID, and
Tenant) attributes are used as a partition key, whereas the
EncName attribute is used as a clustering key as shown in
Figure 6. In a distributed setup, partition key is responsible
for the data distribution across the nodes and the data within
the partition is sorted based on the clustering key.
Let us consider again the multi-tenant log management
application in which the tenants impose conﬁdentiality require-
ments at increasing levels of granularity. After applying the
encryption process, the Encrypted_Log table contains 3
partitions (see Figure 6) instead of 6 partitions in the state-
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Table ID Tenant EncName Value 
Log 1 1  Byte[] 
Log 2 2 DeviceID Byte[] 
Log 2 2 DeviceName Byte[] 
Log 3 3 DeviceID Byte[] 
Log 3 3 DeviceName Byte[] 
Log 3 3 DeviceType Byte[] 
Partitions 
Composite partition key 
… 
 
KEY DeviceID  
Log|2|2 … … 
… … … 
 
Node a  
KEY DeviceID  
Log|3|3 … … 
Log|1|1 … … 
… … … 
Node n 
Clustering key 
Data distribution across nodes 
Fig. 6: All encrypted attributes of a single row of the
Encrypted_Log are stored exactly on one node in a dis-
tributed setup.
of-practice solution (see Figure 5). Each partition represents a
single row of the Log table for which the data is encrypted.
Therefore, instead of keeping one-to-many mapping between
the Log table (see Figure 1) and the Encrypted_Log table
(see Figure 3) in the state-of-practice solution, the proposed
solution has a one-to-one mapping between the Log table and
the Encrypted_Log table. This implies, all sensitive data of
a single row of the Log table is mapped and stored exactly in
a single row of the Encrypted_Log table. For example,
consider conﬁdentiality requirements of the tenant with id
3 which speciﬁes (DeviceID, DeviceName, and DeviceType)
attributes as sensitive. Instead of storing each attribute, which
needs to be encrypted of a single row of the Log table in
a separate row, all encrypted attributes of a single row for
a particular tenant are stored in one row (i.e. one partition),
but in different columns where each column represents one
encrypted attribute. Considering more attributes of a single
row of the tenant with id 3 to be encrypted, more columns are
added to that row (in a horizontal fashion). This also makes
sure that enforcing encryption at any level of granularity in a
single row of the Log table will end up encrypted data being
stored in a single row of the Encrypted_Log table.
In case of a distributed setup where the data is distributed
based on the partition key, sensitive data within a single row in
our proposed solution is not scattered across multiple nodes.
As shown in Figure 6, each partition is stored exactly on one
node. For example, all the encrypted data of the tenant with
id 2 (shown in gray in Figure 6) is stored in a single row on
one node (i.e. Node a). Similarly, all the encrypted attributes
of the tenant with id 3 (shown in dark gray in Figure 6) are
stored in a single row on another node (i.e. Node n).
Consequently, to perform read, update, and delete op-
erations in a non-distributed setup, a single row of the
Encrypted_Log table needs to be considered to perform an
operation on the Log table. Similarly, in a distributed setup,
only one node holds all the encrypted data of a single row of
the Log table, which is stored in the Encrypted_Log table.
Thus, inter-node communication is not required to perform an
operation. Therefore, the performance is signiﬁcantly better
than that of the approach discussed in the previous section.
IV. EVALUATION
The previous section presented our proposed solution, which
leverages the ﬂexible data model of a columnar NoSQL
database such as Apache Cassandra to realize scalable and
dynamic data encryption. This section further evaluates the
beneﬁts offered by our proposed solution in terms of good
performance and better scalability to deal with the problem of
data encryption at various levels of granularity.
In Section IV-A, we ﬁrst brieﬂy describe our experimental
setup and give the essential details of prototype implementa-
tions used for the evaluation. Then, we discuss the deployment
setups and characterize different workloads in which these
prototype implementations are evaluated. Finally, we present
our experimental results in Section IV-B.
A. Experimental Setup
We implemented two prototypes2 which support encryption
at various levels of granularity: one is based on the state-
of-practice solution described in Section II-C (Prototype A)
and the other is based on our proposed solution discussed
in Section III (Prototype B). Consequently, the Prototype A
does not take into account an efﬁcient data mapping strategy
and the underlying data storage model, whereas the Prototype
B takes these factors into consideration. Both prototypes
were implemented on top of the Kundera platform [1] by
extending it with a support to execute encryption-enabled
CRUD transactions at differing levels of granularity.
The prototypes are evaluated in two different deployment
environment setups: a single node setup and a cluster setup.
In a single node setup, both client and server processes run
on the same physical machine in which the client process
runs the implemented prototypes, whereas a single Apache
Cassandra service is deployed as the server process. In a
cluster setup, client and server processes operate on different
physical machines. We create a cluster consisting of 3 nodes
as the server process in which the Apache Cassandra service
is deployed and run implemented prototypes on a separate
physical node as the client process.
In our experimental setup, the client/single node is equipped
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU (@ 2.60GHz) Dual and 8 GB
RAM, running Windows 8 and Apache Cassandra 2.0.6. In
case of a cluster setup, the client node connects to distributed
Cassandra consisting of 3 nodes, each consists of Intel(R)
Core(TM) 6400 (@ 2.13GHz) and 4 GB RAM, running 64-bit
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and Cassandra 2.0.6.
The experiments are performed for the multi-tenant LMaaS
application under the condition of encryption-enabled work-
loads. We start our measurements with 1, 000 Log entries
and increase that number up to 10, 000 Log entries to see
2Both prototypes are available at: https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/ansar.raﬁque
/BDSE2017-Prototypes.zip.
889
0
10
20
30
40
50
1000 2000 4000 8000 10000
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
# of Log Entries
Prototype A Prototype B
(a) Execution time for the insert op-
eration
0
500
1000
1500
1000 2000 4000 8000 10000
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
# of Log Entries
Prototype A Prototype B
(b) Execution time for the read oper-
ation
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1000 2000 4000 8000 10000
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
# of Log Entries
Prototype A Prototype B
(c) Execution time for the update
operation.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1000 2000 4000 8000 10000
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
# of Log Entries
Prototype A Prototype B
(d) Execution time for the delete op-
eration.
Fig. 7: Total execution time to perform encryption-enabled
CRUD transactions for both prototype implementations under
different workloads on a single node setup with 3 encrypted
attributes.
how both prototypes scale when the data size increases. We
speciﬁcally measure (i) the performance in terms of execution
time for both prototypes by executing encryption-enabled
CRUD transactions under different workloads with the data
size ranging between 1, 000 and 10, 000 Log entries, (ii) the
performance impact on both prototype implementations under
different workloads at various levels of granularity when the
database service scales out (i.e. # of nodes), and (iii) the
cost of executing CRUD transactions under the condition of
encryption-enabled workloads at various levels of granularity
(i.e. # of attributes). Beyond these experiments, we also run
additional benchmarks for both prototypes where we scale out
the database service and varied the number of attributes to
see the impact on CRUD transactions. However, due to space
limitations, we only focus on the above measurements.
B. Experimental Results
In this section, we analyze the performance results to
quantify the performance impact of both prototypes.
The results for encryption-enabled CRUD transactions at
the ﬁne-grained level (i.e. encrypting 3 attributes of an entity)
with the data size ranging between 1, 000 and 10, 000 Log
entries on a single node setup, are presented in Figure 7 and
on a cluster setup when the database service scales out are
presented in Figure 8.
As shown in Figure 7(a), there are no variations, both
prototypes take almost the same amount of time to perform
an insert operation for varying data size. However, for read,
update, and delete operations as shown in Figure 7(b), Fig-
ure 7(c), and Figure 7(d) respectively, the execution time of
the Prototype A, which is based on the state-of-practice is
higher than the Prototype B, which is built on our proposed
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Fig. 8: Total execution time to perform encryption-enabled
CRUD transactions for both prototype implementations under
different workloads on a cluster setup consisting of 3 nodes
with 3 encrypted attributes.
solution. The primary reason is the underlying distribution of
encrypted data. For the Prototype A, each encrypted attribute
of an entity is stored in a separate row. Therefore, multiple
rows needed to be read ﬁrst and then decrypted to construct a
single row of the Log table. In addition, the execution time of
the Prototype A drastically increases with the increase in the
data size. On the other hand, as we can see that the execution
time of the Prototype B remains relatively the same. This is
mainly because of the underlying data mapping strategy where
all encrypted attributes of a single row (i.e. an entity) for a
particular tenant are stored in one row. Therefore, a single row,
which contains ciphertext (i.e. encrypted attributes) needed to
be read and decrypted to construct a row of the Log table,
which contains plaintext.
In case of a distributed setup, as depicted in Figure 8(a),
the execution time of the prototype A for the insert operation
is less than the execution time of the Prototype B for different
data size with small variations in execution time. The reason
that the Prototype B takes slightly more time than the Proto-
type A is mainly because the Prototype B needs to ﬁnd the
node, which is responsible for storing the data to be able to
co-locate all encrypted attributes on the same node. However,
the differences between both prototypes are clearly visible in
Figure 8(b), Figure 8(c), and Figure 8(d) for read, update, and
delete operations respectively. As we can see that Prototype A
takes more time to execute read, update, and delete operations
when the database service scales out. In order to read, update,
and delete a single row (i.e. an entity) using the Prototype A,
multiple nodes need to be coordinated ﬁrst and then within
each node, multiple rows need to be manipulated. In addition,
the execution time of the Prototype A increases signiﬁcantly
when the data size increases. On the other hand, the data size
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(a) Execution time for the Prototype
A on a single node.
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(c) Execution time for the Prototype
A on a cluster.
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(d) Execution time for the Prototype
B on a cluster.
Fig. 9: Total execution time for 10, 000 Log entries with
increasing # of attributes on a single node setup and a cluster
setup consisting of 3 nodes.
has no impact on the Prototype B. In order to read, update, and
delete a single entity, only a single node needs to be considered
and within that node, a single row needs to be manipulated.
Therefore, the Prototype B, which is built on our proposed
solution is better performance-wise and is more scalable than
the prototype A.
It is important to note that the execution time of the
Prototype B for read, update, and delete operations on both
deployment setups (i.e. a single node setup and a cluster setup)
increases in a linear fashion with the number of Log entries
(not very visible in Figures 7 and 8). However, the execution
time of the Prototype B is negligible compared to the execution
time of the Prototype A especially when the data size increases
from 4, 000 Log entries as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
The results of executing encryption-enabled CRUD trans-
actions at various levels of granularity (i.e. # of attributes) on
a single node setup are shown in Figures 9(a) and 9(b) for
Prototypes A and B respectively and on a cluster setup are
outlined in Figure 9(c) for the Prototype A and Figure 9(d)
for the Prototype B.
As shown, the execution time of the Prototype A for the
insert operation on a single node setup is the same for dif-
ferent levels of granularity, with only small variations visible
when the number of attributes, which need to be encrypted
increase. However, by increasing the number of attributes to
be encrypted, the execution time increases rapidly for read,
update, and delete operations for the Prototype A. For the
Prototype B, as illustrated in Figure 9(b), the execution time
for read, update, and delete operations remains more or less
the same with only small variations.
As shown in Figure 9(c), in case when the database service
scales out, the performance degradation is visible for the read,
update, and delete operations for the Prototype A. However,
this does not affect the Prototype B where the execution time
remains the same, when changing numbers of attributes are
considered for encryption as illustrated in Figure 9(d).
V. RELATED WORK
Data security is the most important issue of cloud storage
and has been a major concern for a long period of time.
Recently, there has been extensive research focusing on high-
lighting the security issues in NoSQL databases [8], [16], [21],
[23]. To end this, several research contributions [5], [13], [22],
[24] have been made, which provide encryption support for
NoSQL databases at different layers to protect outsourced data.
The research conducted by Tian et al. [24] focuses on data
encryption at the middleware layer. The authors proposed a
middleware for data encryption in the MongoDB. The key
differences with our research are: (i) they require to specify
the conﬁdential data during the deployment time, whereas
our research perspective is on-the-ﬂy (i.e. run-time) data
encryption, (ii) our research focuses on providing a support
for data encryption for different tenants at various levels of
granularity, whereas they do not consider this explicitly, and
(iii) their main focus is on transparency, whereas transparency
is our secondary focus with a primary focus on supporting
ﬁne-grained data encryption, while also achieving good per-
formance and better scalability.
The existing solutions in the state-of-practice [11], [14]
to provide encryption support at the middleware layer either
(i) offer limited support for the data encryption where the
attributes with only speciﬁc data types can be encrypted, or
(ii) provide solution-speciﬁc data types which should be used
in the application to encrypt the sensitive data.
A number of libraries are available in different programming
languages, providing encryption support in the application
layer. For example, one of the easiest ways to encrypt sensitive
data in Java is by using custom data types provided by the
Java simpliﬁed encryption (Jasypt) [11]. Jasypt is a Java
library which facilitates developers to add encryption support
with minimum effort. However, these libraries have some
limitations: (i) they need to be conﬁgured to specify sensitive
data during deployment time, (ii) they only support attribute-
level data encryption and provide their own data types to be
used in the application code to specify sensitive data, hence
require modiﬁcations in the application layer, and (iii) they do
not support encryption at various-levels of granularity, which
can also be altered during run-time. Although, these libraries
can be modiﬁed to support encryption for various NoSQL
databases, but at this moment, no contribution has been done in
this direction and the support is limited to relational databases.
In another related work, the authors proposed TEAL [14]
that provides transparent encryption support in the abstraction
layer. The main objective of TEAL is to facilitate developers to
re-use existing software components and seamlessly migrate to
secure storage services. However, they do not consider secure
storage at differing levels of granularity and only operate
on relational databases, which share the same data model,
891
whereas our research targets NoSQL databases, which follow
heterogeneous data models.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst effort that
purposes such data mapping strategy that leverages schema
ﬂexibility of NoSQL to achieve scalable, dynamic, and ﬁne-
grained data encryption for multi-tenant SaaS applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
Outsourcing data to external third-party cloud storage
providers offers a wide array of clear beneﬁts over hosting
data in on premise data centers. In practice, however, data
conﬁdentiality considerations often prohibit outsourcing con-
ﬁdential data to external and often untrusted storage providers.
This paper presented a data mapping strategy that leverages
the data schema ﬂexibility of columnar NoSQL databases
to support dynamic yet scalable data encryption that can be
enacted at different levels of granularity. Our prototype imple-
mentation has validated this data mapping strategy in the con-
text of a multi-tenant SaaS application, a Log Management-as-
a-Service (LMaaS) offering, and we have performed a compre-
hensive evaluation of the performance and scalability beneﬁts.
These results can promote further research and development
of critical applications based on our proposed solution, where
the data conﬁdentiality requirements are much higher, varies
greatly, and also the performance is the key factor.
This work ﬁts into our ongoing research on application-
level middleware for federated data storage architectures in
support of multi-tenant SaaS applications. We envision the
creation of policy-driven storage mechanisms that select the
most appropriate data mapping strategy dynamically, based
on customer SLAs and available storage resources. In future
work, we will also explore different data mapping strategies
and further investigate performance optimization, by providing
improved data distribution support, for example by grouping
all sensitive and non-sensitive data belonging to the same
entity, and storing them together.
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